University of Dayton Review
Volume 4
Number 3 Autumn

Article 3

1967

Disciplinary Problems of the Colonial Militia
Paul J. Rizzo
U.S. Army

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr

Recommended Citation
Rizzo, Paul J. (1967) "Disciplinary Problems of the Colonial Militia," University of Dayton Review: Vol. 4:
No. 3, Article 3.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol4/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Dayton Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information, please contact
mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

Rizzo: Disciplinary Problems of the Colonial Militia

Disciplinary Proble:rns
in the Colonial Militia
by Paul

J. Rizzo, Lt. Col. , U. S. Army

To the average present-day American , the credit for the American victory in the
Revolutionary War must go to the Minutemen and the other militia who left their plowshares, hastily took up their ever-ready muskets and coolly and decisively routed the best
Redcoats that King George III could throw against the Colonies. The outstanding American
leadership of men like Washington and Greene, the monumental blunders of British strategy , mediocre British leadership, the vital role of America's allies, and the invaluable contribution of the American Continental ("Regular" ) Army are normally overlooked or minimized. The inescapable conclusion seems to be that one New England farmer, untrained in
the art of war, but fighting for his liberty, could defeat any ten professional British soldiers.
In the cold light of history, however, the performance of the Colonial Militia falls
considerably short of the accomplishments claimed. The untrained, short-term militiaman
was in truth of very dubious value in the winning of the war. While the various deficiencies
of the Colonial militia system could be discussed at book length, only one of the major
weaknesses is singled out and analyzed in this article - the lack of discipline in the Colonial
Militia.

The Basic Stumbling Block : "Th e Leveling Spirit "
General George Washington, soon after assuming command of the massed American
militia at Cambridge, Massachusetts in July 1775, realized that the strongest bar to discipline in the newly-formed "army" was the so-called "leveling" doctrine. This theory of
equality had developed progressively for generations in democratic New England; in aristocratic Virginia, on the contrary, it was considered undesirable to lessen the gap between
the caste of "gentlemen" and that of "persons of lower station." Thus , the New England
militiamen were of the opinion that every man was "just as good as any other man and a
little better," and were permeated with what the Southern colonists called "the leveling
spirit ... I
The "leveling spirit" obviously undermined any attempts at discipline among the
predominately New England militia units of the new army. From Washington on down,
the officers could not maintain proper dignity and necessary authority over their men or
expect obedience to their commands.

1 George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin , R ebels and Redcoats, p. 82; Lynn Mo ntross, Rag Tag and
Hobtail: Th e Story of the Continental A rmy, 1775·1783, p. 38.
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Many non-New Englanders and foreign observers readily recognized that the Yankee
"leveling system" was a deterrent to effective discipline. Joseph Reed, an observant Pennsylvanian, noted the consequences of this attitude in a letter to his wife:
To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into an army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where ... so great an equality and so
thorough a leveling spirit predominates, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable .... You
may form some notion of it when I tell you that yesterday morning a captain
of horse ... was seen shaving one of his men on the parade near the house. 2
Colonel Stephen Moylen, another native of the Quaker State, deplored the "spirit of
equality which reigns through this country." Concerning home town troops in the militia, he noted that a commander was "afraid of exerting that authority necessary for expediting his business." Moylen pointed out that a commander "must shake every man by
the hand, and desire, beg, and pray, do brother, do my friend, do such a thing, whereas a
few hearty damns from a person who did not care a damn for them would have a much
better effect.,,3
Louis de Recicourt Ganot, a French observer with the American Army in 1777, was
prompted to comment on the attitude of American "levelers": "The lack of sense of discipline and respect for officers can be explained by the national character and by the
spirit of liberty, independence, and equality which these people possess.,,4

Lack of Effective Control Over Discipline
Attempts by commanders to enforce discipline among the characteristically irregular militia units were continually hampered by the double standard concerning discipline
of Continental Army troops as opposed to that of militia forces. The National Articles of
War, drawn up by the Continental Congress in 1775, listed required standards and punishments, in an attempt to clarify and standardize a cod~ of discipline. 5 However, in 1776
the Congress declared that militiamen in the Continental Army were to be considered
under the National Articles of War only when they were acting in actual conjunction with
regular troops. 6 In addition, any colony might, if so inclined, reserve the right of the
2 Letter; Joseph Reed to his wife, Oct. 11, 1776, William B. Reed, Life and Correspondence of
Joseph Reed, I, 243, as quoted in Scheer and Rankin, op. cit., p. 82.
3 Ibid.

4 Louis de Recicourt Ganot, "The American Revolutionary Army: A French Estimate in 1777," tr.
and ed. by Durand Echeverria and Orville T. Murphy. Military Affairs, XXVII, No.4 (Winter 19634) 153-162.
5 Scheer and Rankin, op. cit., pp. 74,94.
6

Worthington C. Ford, ed.,Journals of the Continental Congress, V, (Sep. 14, 1776),758.
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commanding officer or executive to mitigate a sentence pronounced on one of their militiamen even if the offender was serving under the Articles of War. It was only with such
extreme caution that the Continental Congress attempted to nationalize the militia. 7
Codes of the various colonies for militia not under the National Articles of War were
notoriously lenient. For example, Rhode Island in 1775 made the death penalty mandatory for its militia only for abandoning a post before the enemy , thus leaving such major
offenses as desertion or even mutiny to be dealt with only at the discretion of the courtsmartial board without capital punishment. 8 Conversely, the Pennsylvania Council of Safety
in the same year specified the death penalty for such offenses as desertion and mutiny,
but the Pennsylvania Militia Law of 1777 allowed only a fine for a sentinel caught sleeping at his post or even deserting it! 9
Obviously , such a weak and varied body of national and provincial disciplinary codes,
full of loopholes and inconsistencies, did not provide an effective foundation upon which
to build a workable disciplinary system in the state militia forces.

"An Army afGenerals"
As General Richard Montgomery , a contemporary American observer , once wryly
commented, the "army" which the Continental Congress created on June 15 , 1775 was
indeed "an army of generals. ,, 10 This was no more apparent than at Boston later that
summer, after Washington commenced the formidable task of building an effective fighting force out of the chaos of the assembled militia bands.
Considering the adverse effects of the "leveling spirit" on discipline and the lax and
inconsistent standards of militia discipline , the actual degree of order among the combined
militia forces can readily be imagined. One experience in Captain Thomas Po or 's Massachusetts militia company provides an insight into the behavior of the New Englanders
who had thronged to the siege of Boston in 1775. The soldiery in the unit became so
aroused when the captain verbally reprimanded them for choosing an unqualified man
for sergeant, that they walked away en masse and refused to perform their duties. Poor
Captain Poor found himself in such a predicament that he had to reassemble the company
and apologize for his conduct! 11
One of the main problems facing Washington - and every other American general was that these militia volunteers could see no reason why they should not return home to

7 Peter Force, ed. , A merican A rchives, 4th Series, IV , 62.
8 "Rules of the Army of Observation," Jun e 1775, Rhode Island Collection of R ecords, vii, 340ff.
as summarized by Allen Bowman, Morale of the A merican Revolutionary A rmy, p. 143.

9 The Statutes of Pennsylvania, IX , 90-94, as qu oted in Bowman, op. cit., p. 143.
10 Montross, op. cit. , p. 38.
11 Bowman, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
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look after the necessary farm chores and private affairs during a period of activity. Nor
were they willing to submit to onerous duties and rules of behavior they themselves did
not formulate. His Majesty's Army seemed helpless enough penned up in Boston, so why
not take a little nap while on guard? - there were plenty of other sentries! And moreover, the company commander, who had kept the harness shop back in the home town,
was not likely to be hard on the boys who had selected him as their captain! The result
was that from the moment of Washington's coming and the subsequent beginning of dis12
ciplinary measures, orderly books were quickly filled with notices of courts-martial.
Infractions of the law were not confined to private soldiers. One captain was found
guilty of taking home large quantities of food issued for his troops, and other officers of
the militia forces of fraudulently withholding their men's pay.13

Saucy Talk and Thievery
The disciplinary problem among the militia was enough to plague any professional
officer, and the veteran General Charles Lee proved that his nickname "Boiling Water"
was not a misnomer. A journal kept by one of the junior officers in Lee's command attests
that one day "Stephen Stanwood for saucy talk to Gen. Lee had his head broke. The
General gave him a dollar and sent for the doctor.,,14 In another instance, this time at
Ft. Ticonderoga, N.Y., in the summer of 1777, General St. Clair was introduced to the
militia brand of "discipline." After first trying in vain to induce two regimen ts of Massachusetts militia to remain at Ticonderoga a few days after their terms expired, St. Clair
finally sent them off in disgust because "their conduct was so licentious and disorderly,
and their example beginning to affect the Continental [Army 1 troops.,,15
Thievery also was rampant within the undisciplined militia units. In fact, its extent
was so widespread that in 1776 the Continental Congress enacted legislation stiffening
penalties for theft in an effort to halt the theft of arms and equipment which prevailed at
that time. 16 In one instance, the diary of Corporal Amos Farnsworth of Groton, Massachusetts, described the common punishment for stealing and commented bitterly on the
inequity of human nature:
Paraded with the battalion, and saw two whipt for Stealing, and Another drommed out of ye Camps. 0 what a pernitious thing it is for A man to steal and
cheat his fellow nabors, and how Provocking it is to God. 1 7
12 Scheer and Rankin, op. cit., p. 81.
13 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
14 Ibid.

15 St. Clair Papers, 1,428, July 14,1777, as quoted in Bowman, op. cit., p. 145.

16 Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, V, (Sep. 14, 1776), 758 .
17 As quoted in Montross, op. cit. , p. 44.
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"Hors De Combat"
As a classic description of the general shenanigans and "hell raising" that went on
in camp, the following extracts from the diary of Private David How, a 17-year old Massachusetts militia enlistee, hint at some lively moments in the American lines around Boston
during the winter of 1775-1776:

Feb . 7 - This Day two men in Cambridge got a bantering who wodd Drink
the most and they Drinkd So much That one of them Died in About one hour
or two after.
Feb. 10 - There was two women Drumd out of Camp this fore noon. That
man was Buried that killed himself Drinking.
Feb. 12 - There was a man found Dead in a room with A Woman this morning. It is not known what killed him. 18
As Washington began to assert his authority, punishments for infractions of discipline increased. Another entry in Private How's diary notes: "There was four of Capt.
Willey men Whept the first fifteen Stripes for deniing his Deuty the 2nd 39 Stripes for
Stealing and Deserting, 3rd 10 Lashes Deniing his Duty & getting Drunk." 1 9

The Dubious Value of the Backwoods Riflemen
One of the few contingents of militia forces from outside New England to join the
American forces at Boston in 1775 was composed of ten companies of expert riflemen six from Pennsylvania, two from Maryland, and two from Virginia. As could be expected,
these frontier riflemen were lusty and proud, and their fierce individualism ran directly
contrary to Washington's ideas of discipline. 20
Little more than two months after the vaunted riflemen from Pennsylvania reached the
American camp, their inherent insubordination reached a climax. Twice before they had
broken open the guard house and released their companions who had been jailed for small
offenses. However, full scale mutiny threatened with the jailing of a sergeant for neglect
of duty. As one of the Virginia riflemen who was an eyewitness reported:
In about twenty minutes thirty two of Captain Ross's company with their
loaded rifles swore, by God, they would go to the Main Guard [House 1 and
release the man or lose their lives, and set off as hard as they could run ...
General Washington reinforced the Guard to five hundred men with fixed
bayonets and loaded pieces. 21
18 David How, Diary, 5,6, as quoted in Montross, 0p. cit., pp. 43-44.

19 Ibid., p. 44.
20 Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, I, 106-107.
21 Jesse Lukens to John Shaw Jr., Sept. 13,1775, American Historical Record, I (Dec. 1872), 547548, as quoted in Scheer and Rankin , op. cit., p. 87.
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Frightened, the rebellious troops put down their arms at Washington's command.
Everything considered, the riflemen were of limited value during the seige of Boston, since they were by nature totally unfit for dull camp routine. They could shoot well,
but their effect against the British camp was more than balanced by the nuisance they
created in the American camp. Washington expressed his wishes that they had never come,
General Lee wished that they were with the British in Boston, and General Thomas considered them "as Indifferent men as I ever served with, their Privates mutinous and often
Deserting to the Enemy, unwilling for Duty of any kind, exceedingly vitious and I think
the army here would be as well without them as with them.,,22
Such incidents were not confmed to New England. The newly-created weak colonial
governments were all practically at the mercy of their respective militia groups. For example, Governor Livingston of New Jersey indicated an unwillingness to callout the New
Jersey militia at one time when necessary, but explained to Washington that it was extremely doubtful whether the militia would obey orders anyway, and that he knew that
the militia troops would be worth little at best. 2 3
Governor Livingston's misgivings about his own militia appear to be fully justified.
Washington appealed to him in January 1777 for a better militia law for New Jersey, complaining that the militia officers were mostly of the lowest order, and were leading their
men into reckless plundering and other mischief. 24 In another instance - this time in
New York in the summer of 1776 - Washington, despite his desperate need for men to
build up his army, sidetracked a plan for more Connecticut militia to join him in his defense of New York because the 2,000 undisciplined Connecticut militia troops already
with him were already producing general confusion within the American forces . 2 5
Disciplinary conditions were no better in the South. Governor Henry of Virginia informed the Virginia Legislature in 1778 that militia discipline was practically non-existent,
and vainly called for a stronger law. 26
As the focus of the war shifted to the Carolinas in the early 1780's, American commanders were plagued by the sometimes shocking breaches of discipline within irregular
southern militia groups. After the militia debacle at the battle of Camden, South Carolina,
in 1780.
The North Carolina militia fled different ways, as their hopes led or their
fears drove them. These who retired the way they came . .. met many of their
friends , armed, and advancing to join the American army; but learning its fate
22 Allen French, Th e First Year of the American Revolution, p. 472.
23 Force , 0p. cit., 5th series, III , 618.
24 J ohn C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, VII, (Jan. 24, 1777), 56.
25 Ibid., VI, (Sep. 9, 1776) , 39.

26

Bowman, op. cit., p. 151.
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from the refugees, they acted decidedly in concert with the British victors and capturing some, plundering others, and maltreating all the militia fugitives
they met, returned exaultingly home. 2 7
A few months later, when General Nathanael Greene arrived at Charlotte , North Carolina,
and assumed command of the "grand army" of the Southern Department, he was forced
to immediately move the camp. The North Carolina militia had stri~~ed the surrounding
country clean of food, without any compensating military service.
Later in the campaign, Greene complained again of the same problem: " We shall have to operate in a
country that has been exhausted and depopulated by the swarms of mounted militia that
have been impoverishing rather than defending it.,,2 9
In at least one instance , the proclivity of militia forces to plunder after a victory
brought on an eventual reversal. At Hanging Rock, South Carolina, on August 5, 1780, a
force of patriot militiamen defeated a smaller band of Tory militia. Instead of exploiting
their success as they pushed the Tories back through their camp, the victorious patriots
seized the opportunity to plunder the enemy encampment. The commissary's stores were
ransacked and when liquor was found it was disposed of on the spot. While this orgy of
looting and drinking occupied the attention of virtually all the triumphant militiamen,
little thought was given to the scattered forces of the enemy . The Tories seized the opportunity to reassemble in the vicinity to mount a counterattack. Seeing their opponents
rallying, the patriot militia officers did their utmost to organize a new attack, but only
about 200 of the 800 militia could be induced to leave their plundering and resume fighting. As more Tory reinforcements arrived, the patriot militia commander was forced to
order a retreat. Loaded with plunder, the disorganized militiamen , many of them intoxicated, straggled away from the scene of action. Although technically a victory for the
patriot militia, only their lack of discipline had prevented a complete Tory defeat. 30

Conclusion
It is evident that true military discipline was impossible in the militia forces of the
American Revolutionary Army. Their free and easy ideas of army law, hatred of anything
savoring of a standing regular army, belief in the "leveling spirit," and numerous political
considerations rendered the militia almost unmapageable. Moreover , their service in conjunction with regular Continental Army troops seriously complicated disciplinary problems for the entire army . Militia troops undoubtedly helped to bring victory to the Amer27 As related by Col. Otho R. Williams, in W. Gilmore Simms, Th e Life of Nathanael Greene, p. 124.
28 William Gordon, The History of the United States of America, IV, 30, as referred to in Ward, op.
cit., II, 750.

29 As quoted in Simms, op. cit., p. 124.
30 Ward, op. cit., II, 710.
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ican cause, but they did so in spite of their insubordination.
The lack of discipline displayed by American militia forces throughout the War for
Independence constituted one of the major weaknesses of the militia, and accounts in
most part for their generally sorry combat record. Actually, this irregularity was an inevitable product of the interaction of the other inherent weaknesses of the Colonial militia
system - lack of central control, inadequate training, amateur leadership, and loose organization, complicated by a weak central government and short term enlistments.
General Washington's analysis of the effect of the militia insubordination and unreliability stands as a classic summation of the problems engendered by the undisciplined
militiamen: "Militia come in you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you
cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at
a critical moment.,,31

Epilogue
Well over a century and four other American wars passed before the major weaknesses of the Colonial militia system were largely corrected by the National Defense Act
of 1916. By this act, passed on the eve of America's entry into a global conflict, Congress recognized at long last Washington's recommendation that the militia - since reconstituted as the National Guard - be "well organized .. . upon a plan that will pervade
all the states.,,3 2 America's "citizen soldiers" were at last acquiring professionalism.

31 As qu ot ed in R. Ern est Dupuy and Trevo r N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of A merica, p. 120.
32 Ibid., p. 355.
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